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Report No. 2600224 October 202618:59

5 Facts About: “Yemen Has Legitimate Demands and Rights” (Canal Red)

Analyzed piece“Yemen tiene demandas y derechos legítimos. Entrevista a Wahed Abu Ras, ministro yemení | BALAKLAVA” (Yemen has legitimate demands and rights. Interview with Wahed Abu Ras, Yemeni minister | BALAKLAVA)Canal Red · 8 October 2026 · view original ↗

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62/100

OMD Veracity Index
Medium

40 claims verified in the piece

  • 17 True
  • 12 Misleading
  • 3 False
  • 6 Insufficient evidence
  • 2 Interpretive dispute
Report
No. 26002 · v01
Cut-off date
19 October 2026
Scope
Israel and the Greater Middle East

In this report we analyze the video “Yemen tiene demandas y derechos legítimos”. Entrevista a Wahed Abu Ras, ministro yemení | BALAKLAVA (“Yemen has legitimate demands and rights”. Interview with Wahed Abu Ras, Yemeni minister | BALAKLAVA), published on October 8, 2026 on the YouTube channel Canal Red (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVq6s4EINqY). In this interview, journalist Irene Zugasti speaks with Abdul Wahed Abu Ras, head of foreign affairs of the Sanaa government, which is controlled by Ansar Allah (the Houthis) and is not internationally recognized. Abu Ras presents the offensive of September 2026 as a response to the blockade and to the Saudi mobilizations, denies that his movement acts on Iran’s behalf and asks Europe not to become involved in the conflict since, he argues, navigation in the Red Sea is normal and Yemen poses no threat to anyone beyond its borders.

Summary of the analysis

The video contains 40 verifiable factual claims: 17 true, 12 misleading, 3 false, 6 with insufficient evidence and 2 interpretive disputes. Its OMD Veracity Index is 62 out of 100 (weighted base: 61.7), and no penalty had to be applied, since no serious misleading or false claims were found during the analysis.

The interview cites no sources and the host does not contrast the claims of the interviewee, who is a representative of one of the parties to the conflict. The figures on attacks and casualties that he mentions come from the military spokesman and from the Ministry of Health of the Sanaa government, and for that reason they are always attributed in this report to that party. In accordance with point 2 of the method, the host’s claims in the introduction and in the questions are also counted, since the video presents them as the framework of the conversation.

The main veracity problems are concentrated at two points. The first is the account of the origin of the escalation (Blocks I and II), where 9 of the 19 claims are misleading because they omit the actions by Ansar Allah that form part of the same sequence: the unauthorized Iranian flight, the naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and the ground offensive of September 3. The second is the message addressed to Europe, sustained by three false claims: that navigation in the Red Sea is normal (III.3), that Ansar Allah did not move during the wars against Iran (V.4) and that its campaign is not directed against anyone outside Yemen (V.12).

OMD: Datos Vrs Relatos is produced by CEJAPIM — Center for Jewish Studies and Political Analysis of Israel and the Middle East. More episodes of the program at cejapim.org/en/omd-tv; the previous episode fact-checks “Israel Is Running Out of Money,” by Solo Fonseca. This is the English version of the report; the original was written in Spanish and is available at cejapim.org/omdinforme/26002.

5 Facts

What was said and what the sources say

The main claims of the piece, chosen from the 40 verified in the report for their informative impact and their potential to mislead. Each one with its verdict, its context and its sources. Quotes are our translation from Spanish.

  1. Claim I.3Relevance 3 · Central

    Misleading

    Before the offensive, Saudi Arabia mobilized forces on the west coast and next to Bab el-Mandeb in order to attack Hodeidah, and in Taiz, Marib and Al Bayda in order to attack Sanaa; the Sanaa forces merely responded to those mobilizations
    Why it is “Misleading”: context and sources

    Between July and August 2026, Saudi Arabia reorganized the Yemeni forces opposed to Ansar Allah and considered supporting a ground offensive, but the analyses consulted stress that it never decided on one and that the deployment was intended above all as a deterrent. The documented sequence includes, by contrast, several actions by Ansar Allah that the interview omits: the attack at Hays on July 4 and 5, the naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20, the attacks on government forces from August 6 onward, and the ground offensive of September 3 itself, which AFP and independent analysts attribute to Ansar Allah. By mid-August, AFP was already reporting, citing military sources in Sanaa, that the movement was preparing an operation south of Hodeidah with some 2,000 fighters. The reading of the offensive as a defensive response comes from the Sanaa authorities and is not corroborated by any independent source.

    Sources

    1. Soufan Center (security think tank), August 20, 2026
    2. The Media Line / Jerusalem Post, August 13, 2026
    3. South24, reproducing AFP, August 20, 2026
    4. Al Jazeera, September 8, 2026
    5. House of Commons Library, CBP10427, October 5, 2026
  2. Claim II.11Relevance 2 · Supporting

    Misleading

    Saudi Arabia has confiscated and plundered the country’s gas, oil and other resources
    Why it is “Misleading”: context and sources

    Until October 2022, it was the internationally recognized government, and not Saudi Arabia, that exported crude oil from Hadramaut and Shabwa. Exports have been halted since October and November 2022, when Ansar Allah drones struck the Al Dhabba and Qena terminals; the movement justified those attacks at the time as a way of preventing the “plunder” of the country’s oil wealth. The accusations that Saudi Arabia appropriates those revenues come from Ansar Allah sources and have been confirmed neither by the United Nations nor by the World Bank, which in 2026 continues to point to the halt in exports as one of the causes of the economic deterioration. In presenting this as a current cause of poverty, the claim omits that the interruption of exports is due to the movement’s own attacks.

    Sources

    1. The Peninsula / AP, October 22, 2022
    2. Pipeline & Gas Journal / Reuters, November 22, 2022
    3. Middle East Institute, December 9, 2022
    4. OilPrice, Sanaa allegations, August 5, 2022
    5. World Bank, May 21, 2026
  3. Claim V.4Relevance 3 · Central

    False

    If Ansar Allah were responding to an Iranian agenda, it “would have moved when Iran was suffering dozens or hundreds of air strikes”; that is, it did not act militarily during the wars against Iran
    Why it is “False”: context and sources

    In the two wars against Iran, Ansar Allah attacked Israel and stated that it was doing so in support of, or in coordination with, Tehran. During the twelve-day war, its military spokesman, Yahya Saree, claimed responsibility on June 15, 2025 for the launch of ballistic missiles against Jaffa in an operation “coordinated” with the Iranian army and the Revolutionary Guard. In the war that began on February 28, 2026, the movement remained on the sidelines for four weeks, but on March 28 it fired missiles and a drone at Beersheba and Eilat, “in support and backing of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. The qualification is that its intervention was late and limited, and that it did not then resume its attacks on shipping.

    Sources

    1. The New Arab, March 28, 2026
    2. FDD's Long War Journal, March 28, 2026
    3. Euronews, June 15, 2025
  4. Claim III.3Relevance 3 · Central

    False

    Commercial traffic in the Red Sea and through Bab el-Mandeb “is completely normal” and commercial and European vessels “move smoothly”
    Why it is “False”: context and sources

    According to the International Monetary Fund’s PortWatch monitor, in September 2026 an average of 26.6 vessels a day crossed Bab el-Mandeb, compared with 75.4 in September 2023 (−64.8%), and between October 1 and 11, 2026, 28.7 a day compared with 77.7 in the same period of 2023 (−63%). Lloyd's List Intelligence, using a different methodology, places September traffic 47% below the pre-crisis level. Incidents were recorded in the same week as the interview: on October 4, a tanker reported explosions 60 nautical miles south of Mocha, and on October 7 a container ship was fired on off Yemen. Between July and August 2026 there were, in addition, a dozen attacks on merchant vessels, one of them leaving six crew members dead. As a qualification, no attacks were recorded in September, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd announced their partial return to the route, and on September 10 Ansar Allah informed the European Union that it would not attack European vessels.

    Sources

    1. IMF, PortWatch, daily chokepoint data
    2. Lloyd's List Intelligence, Red Sea Brief, October 15, 2026
    3. DefconLevel, reproducing UKMTO advisory 15126, October 4, 2026
    4. Red Team Analysis Society, reproducing Africa Center, October 8, 2026
    5. AlMonitor, September 2026
    6. Iran International, reproducing the Financial Times, September 25, 2026
  5. Claim V.12Relevance 3 · Central

    False

    With this battle, the Yemeni people [do not] aim “against Europe, or against anyone beyond their borders”
    Why it is “False”: context and sources

    In 2026, Ansar Allah has repeatedly attacked beyond Yemen’s borders. It declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20 and, in the following days, attacked Saudi tankers and facilities in Jizan and Yanbu; on October 5 it attacked the Saudi airports of Jizan and Najran, and on October 13 it threatened Aramco’s facilities. Between March and June it launched missiles and drones at Israel, and between July and August a dozen attacks on merchant vessels were recorded, one of them leaving six crew members dead. With regard to Europe, on September 10 the movement informed the European Union that it would not attack European vessels, but the claim excludes any external actor.

    Sources

    1. Al Jazeera, July 20, 2026
    2. Al Jazeera, July 24, 2026
    3. Al Jazeera, October 13, 2026
    4. The New Arab, March 28, 2026
    5. Red Team Analysis Society, reproducing Africa Center, October 8, 2026
    6. Iran International, reproducing the Financial Times, September 25, 2026

Free access

Full report No. 26002

  • All 40 verified claims, one by one, with their verdict.
  • The context and linked sources for each fact.
  • The calculation of the OMD Veracity Index and the methodology.
  • Online reading and PDF download with the same design.

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Right of reply

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Report details
Report
No. 26002 · version 01
Analyzed piece
Yemen tiene demandas y derechos legítimos. Entrevista a Wahed Abu Ras, ministro yemení | BALAKLAVA
Outlet or channel
Canal Red
Broadcast date
8 October 2026
Cut-off date
19 October 2026
Claims analyzed
40
Production
CEJAPIM — Center for Judaic Studies and Political Analysis of Israel and the Middle East

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